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A Sŵall MaŶufaĐtuƌeƌ͛s Guide to SuƌviviŶg the ͚AƌaďesƋue͛ ‘estƌuĐtuƌiŶg of 
Shipyards in Turkey 
 
Abstract 
Drawing on an ethnographic case study, the present paper rectifies the lack of 
sǇsteŵatiĐ ƌeseaƌĐh iŶto the ĐhalleŶges of ƌestƌuĐtuƌiŶg iŶ TuƌkeǇ͛s 
shipbuilding industry for small manufacturers and their managerial responses. 
Inquiries are essentially predicated on unstructured conversations with the 
owner/manager of a shipyard investigated, workplace observations and 
supplementary conversations with employees as well as elite interviews with 
the portal authorities. To present the findings in a conceptual frame-work, the 
paper uses the word arabesque restructuring. The term refers to a fairly 
distinct combination of both detrimental and benign aspects of the 
restructuring in shipyards: The former is related to, for example, discrimination 
against small shipyards, patronage and inadequate regulations. Positive 
aspects include, among others, investment diversification and strategised 
retention. They also encompass the rebuttal of a reputedly intrinsic link 
between shorter hours and work-life balance in addition to the magnitude of 
companies and becoming globalised. 
 
Introduction 
Especially over the past decade, Turkey has undergone a silent revolution as 
various economic and political reforms have been introduced in order to attain 
one of the fastest and largest of emerging economies in the World amid the 
preparations for the EU accession talks.  
In the shipbuilding sector, Turkish army had long opposed foreign capital, 
citing national security. However, to initiate the transformation of shipyards 
from a cottage industry to a global one, the government rebuffed the generals 
–whose pension fund privately owns one of the largest shipyards in the 
country. Sectorial expansion became considerable: The output capacity 
increased from half a million in 2002 to 3.6m dwt in 2012. Meanwhile, the 
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annual export volume of the ships built soared from $490m up to $1.3bn. 
Turkey ranked sixth in the World with 81 new ship orders by the end of 2012. 
Upon the completion of all investments, total capacity is expected to rise to 
7.2m dwt (Ship2Shore, 2012). 
This study aims to rectify the lack of systematic research specifically into the 
restructuring of shipyards in Turkey. In particular, we will examine the 
challenges that the restructuring implied for small shipyards along with 
managerial responses to such challenges amid their on-going crisis.  
For the sake of convenience, the findings will be conceptualised through what 
oŶe ŵight Đall aŶ ͚aƌaďesƋue ƌestƌuĐtuƌiŶg͛. The word arabesque usually has a 
critical meaning in Turkish for melancholic music. In the broader context of 
Islamic and European art, on the other hand, it positively refers to the rich 
patterns of motifs. Bearing these dichotomic connotations in mind, the present 
paper barrows the concept to address a potentially distinct combination of 
both detrimental and benign aspects of the restructuring in shipyards. As 
stipulated in what follows, the former may be informed by the policy 
challenges such as the mismanagement of recession, heavy-handed policies 
toward small shipyards, oligopolistic pressures, patronage, conflict of interests 
and the under-regulation of industrial relations. Positive aspects of the 
arabesque restructuring may reflect company responses to the challenges with 
investment diversification, strategised retention or moving to outsourcing 
services. Further possibilities may include reconciling longer hours with work-
life balance and going global whilst downsizing to ashes. 
Policy challenges: 
The adverse impacts of recession on the Turkish economy have been well 
highlighted (TUSIAD, 2014). The damage, however, was not evenly spread 
since, differently from smaller firms, the larger ones were able to take effective 
measures. Larger corporations tended to remain safer, if not benefiting from 
the recessionary climate through, for example, speculative investments in 
foreign currencies and state bonds (ISO, 2013). They were also provided with 
the government-supported hedge-funds as a protection against stock-market 
fluctuations (Torlak, 2013). 
Despite the long-term success of ship making, the sector has begun to fall into 
a crisis following the 2009 recession. Notably, there had been more than a ten-
fold increase in the number of employees in the industry during the decade 
3 
 
preceding the beginning of recession in 2009, circa 34,000. On the basis of such 
an expansion, the Chamber of Ship Makers had optimistically predicted a 
similar increase in the following decade, but the existing employment capacity 
actually plummeted by one-third in 2012 (UBAK, 2014). The annual export 
volume of the ships also halved between 2009 and 2012 –to $1.3bn 
(Ship2Shore, 2012). 
The crisis in the shipyards is mostly related to small firms: Small and medium-
sized establishments (SMEs) account for roughly fifty percent of the ship-
making industry. One in five SMEs were closed down over the past few years 
(GISBIR, 2015). In the Black Sea region alone almost 1,500 enterprises were 
reported to have come to a halt in 2013 (Hurriyet, 2013). Despite the lack of 
publically available statistics, the head of the Portal Authorities also mentioned 
even worse trends in the Marmara region when he was interviewed. 
However, it would be wrong to reduce the unprecedented demise of small 
companies in the ship making industry to the recession. There is a crucial gap 
in our knowledge about the implications of restructuring for smaller 
workshops: Exits from the industry, for example, may have something to do 
with competitive market pressures from the recently emerging larger 
manufacturers (OECD, 2011). The anecdotal evidence reported in the press 
further suggested that many of the SMEs were forcefully sealed up for failing 
to comply with a newly introduced site-licence scheme (Haberler.com, 2011). 
Political aspects of the restructuring may play an important role in the state of 
smaller shipyards. Partisan practices of the government, for example, are 
frequently referred to as a cause for concern in Turkey. So much so that 
patronage and cronyism are regarded as the back bone of the political system. 
Political parties, for instance, usually recruit delegates by promising decent jobs 
and promotions (Heper and Keyman, 1998). Clashing with the strongly secular 
tradition of establishment, in particular, Islamic tendency of the ruling AK party 
has added new layers to partisan inclinations in society. Such propensities may 
undermine the precarious positions of smaller ship-makers in terms of, for 
example, winning tender offers or obtaining bank loans. 
The effects of restructuring on small shipyards may be complicated by the 
conflict of interests as well. The conflict is stemmed from what critiques 
dubbed in the UK corporate takeover of the state. That is, successful 
businessmen occasionally join political parties and they become influential 
bureaucrats, MPs, cabinet ministers, if not prime ministers, once they are able 
4 
 
to do so (Monbiot, 2001). In Turkey, however, the process often works in the 
opposite direction: the statesmen with relatively modest backgrounds begin to 
use their authority to gain the ownership of large companies, including 
shipyards (Karabagli, 2014). Corruption allegations are added by a wide-spread 
scepticism that the industry is used for the laundering of money originated 
from drug trafficking between Central Asia and Europe (Cumhuriyet, 2015).  
The under-regulation of industrial relations in shipyards should also be taken 
on board as witnessed by the accidents with serious injuries and death, over 
one hundred and ten lives were lost, for example, from 2001 to 2011 (Barlas, 
2012). GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s atteŵpt to iŶtƌoduĐe health and safety regulations in 
smaller shipyards with the threats of trading suspensions (Bianet, 2008) may 
turn out to be another challenge because of its costs, creating some resistance 
among employers. This should be put against the condemnation of 
parsimonious compensations by the unions (GG, 2014). 
Company Responses: 
All the challenges outlined above may force smaller businesses to develop a 
wide range of survival strategies. One possibility is that they may tap into 
political networks for favouritism, not necessarily with the ruling AK party only, 
but also with a nationally influential Sunni order, Cemaat or the rivalling 
Nationalist Front, Camia –which has considerably undermined the power of 
the former recentlǇ uŶdeƌ the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s tutelage ;)aŵaŶ, ϮϬϭϱͿ. 
The responses of small enterprises to the challenges of restructuring may be 
further informed by the limits of industrial democracy in general. For instance, 
a practical issue in terms of workers exercising their democratic rights, 
specifically in shipyards, may be linked to the heavy presence of gendarme 
outside town centers in Turkey where it is the major policing force. Differently 
from the police, however, gendarme is not accountable to civil courts in the 
events of mishandling (Oz, 2013). The EU urges Turkey to relinquish the 
gendarme as a provision for the accession talks.  
At the workplace level, employers do not have to legally recognise trade 
unions, if they have less than twenty employees, but ship-makers in particular 
also make a remarkable use of temporary staff, four in five (Yilmaz et al, 2015). 
This is seen as a response to seasonal fluctuations in demand because of the 
fishing quotas. The works are also project-based and contingent (OECD, 2011). 
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There is a skills shoƌtage iŶ shipǇaƌds. EŵploǇeƌs͛ desire to utilise existing skills 
optimally may culminate in overtime (Aykac, 2008) and hence, arguably, 
potential problems for the work-life balance (MaĐIŶŶes, ϮϬϬϱͿ. Temporary and 
long-hour jobs with skills shortage may heighten commitment, labour 
productivity and retention-related constrains as well. 
It is possible that the lucky companies among the smaller ones which managed 
to avoid closures may have adopted investment diversification, from core 
production to subsidiary works. Some of such companies may have also gone 
through a downsizing process, shifting toward outsourcing services for larger 
establishments, as happened in the case of, for example, white goods when it 
had been restructured up until the early years of the millennium (Nichols and 
Cam, 2005). 
We will finally evaluate a common assumption that smaller firms are 
necessarily side-lined within the global capitalism as, at best, subordinated 
partners for transnational corporations (Hertz, 2011). This conventional 
understanding will be disputed arguing that as transport and communication 
technologies advance, smaller sizes may give enterprises an opportunity to run 
their own niche businesses independently around the World. 
Method 
The present paper will report the results obtained through an ethnographic 
exploration that took place during the first couple of months of 2015 on the 
experience of a smaller manufacturer with the restructuring of shipyards in 
Turkey. 
The company studied is located in the Marmara region where most of the 
shipyards are situated as well as many of the small workshops that have filed 
bankruptcy amid the restructuring. This one is among a few surviving small 
establishments in the region –small establishments in Turkey are officially 
defined as the ones with less than fifty employees as opposed to the medium-
sized ones, with up to 250 employees, in line with the international literature 
(Forth et al, 2006). 
The paper essentially focuses on the findings from unstructured conversations 
with the owner and manager of the smaller company investigated, albeit there 
are also references to some conversations with three employees, in addition to 
two elite interviews with the Portal Authorities. The reason for this is because 
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we wanted to examine thoroughly what it is like to run a small business 
fighting to survive through the challenges of industrial restructuring. 
We have conducted observations in the workshop to supplement unstructured 
conversations. This has been conceived as a way of avoiding the danger of 
taking face-values (Atkinson et al, 2003). 
Although we managed to contact a number of gate-keepers via the Portal 
Authorities, we did not use only such channels for the risk of a skewed 
selection toward like-minded participants with snowballing (Hennink et al, 
2010). We also specified a number of workplaces and then contacted them 
directly. Luckily, no firm has turned us down and, in the end, we have chosen 
the most suitable one for the purpose of this research. 
Ethical matters have been given a special consideration: Results are presented 
anonymously using pseudonyms. We will use an imaginary name Alperen for 
the main participant ship builder, as his own choice. Due to political 
sensitivities, the company and personal details are reported in a way that 
cannot be traced back to the data sources. 
Challenges: 
The fieldwork outcomes indicated that because of the recessionary 
mismanagement, smaller shipyards suffered disproportionately. Even so, 
industrial restructuring made things much more challenging for them. 
Mismanagement of recessions: 
Alperen believes that recession has been mishandled: A decline in orders 
pushed the prices down. The government pledged to help, but they did not keep 
their words. I would be better prepared, if they had not created false hopes. 
Although the recession has paradoxically benefited some large corporations 
through currency speculations, AlpeƌeŶ͛s aĐĐouŶt in the case of smaller 
companies highlights that fluctuations in dollar had severe impacts since the 
beginning of the recession. Government did nothing to protect small shipyards. 
Heavy-handed closures: 
Alperen argued that the closure of smaller firms is not about their weak 
competitiveness. On the contrary, he thinks that smaller shipyards tend to be 
more competitive thanks to the lower cost of labour and the locational 
mobility. However, he singled out the strongest factor that, in his view, 
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contributes to the competitiveness of small shipyards: Large firms have top 
managers, and then middle managers and then intermediate managers before 
the foremen and team leaders. All these mean that somebody has to pay for 
the expensive life styles of managers. Who is going to finance those expenses? 
Of course customers! But the owners of smaller companies are both managers 
and workers. When customers come to small workshops, they just bear the real 
cost.  
As far as Alperen is concerned, closures were largely triggered by the 
introduction of new regulations amid the restructuring about the quality 
standards, safety installations and site-licences. Acknowledging the difficulties 
with the new regulations in general, he underlined that the site-licence 
requirement was the trickiest one for small ship-makers since they often move 
from one place to another, depending on the regional density of jobs and the 
availability of cheaper coastal lands to rent.  
When interviewed, the head of the Portal Authorities argued that the 
government had to be tough in order to implement its policies: We had given 
all ship-makers enough time to comply with the new proviso for a site-licence. 
However, they did not listen to us since they are used to doing things in rough 
ways. They have to come to terms with the rule of law. During the inspections, 
some thugs threaten us. This is not how you can develop a mature industry. 
Due to such tensions, in particular, the gendarme was instrumental for the 
Portal Authorities: They help us to seal unruly workplaces when the owners 
resist. 
Partisan politics: 
Partisan propensities have severely affected some smaller ship-makers. 
OutsouƌĐiŶg ĐoŶtƌaĐts, foƌ eǆaŵple, ͚are mostly granted under the influence of 
Islamic brotherhood͛ according to Alperen. He stipulated that if Ǉou͛re Ŷot a 
practicing Muslim, life is difficult for you as a manufacturer. 
Non-Islamic manufacturers who are after subsidiary projects may also benefit 
fƌoŵ faǀouƌitisŵ, espeĐiallǇ ďǇ the seĐulaƌ ŵilitaƌǇ͛s ship-making companies, 
but only if, Alperen specified disappointedly, you have general friends in the 
army.  
Alperen lent his story about an unpleasant experience with cronyism: I wanted 
to disŵaŶtle a ship last Ǉear, ďut the offiĐials did Ŷot let ŵe, saǇiŶg that I didŶ͛t 
have licence for that. It cost me fortune to move the wreckage to Sarkoy to go 
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ahead with the job secretly. Couple of months later, the next workshop few 
miles down the shore dismantled a big ship, but no one said anything, since the 
owner is very friendly with the up-stream folks. For the discrimination he was 
subjected to, Alperen is currently taking legal action against the officials. He 
vowed that theǇ asked ŵe to drop the Đase ďut I ǁoŶ͛t, ďeĐause I aŵ right. 
Oligopolistic pressures:  
Despite the hitherto underlined competitive potentials of smaller enterprises, 
they actually have limited room to manoeuvre against larger firms. Alperen 
noted that we cannot make tankers or castells. We can only make small metal 
boats for fishing (up to thirty feet in length and fifteen feet in width). We 
cannot do anything more than assembling either. Main parts such as 
propellants and electrical equipment come from specialist companies.  
Alperen is wary of the oligopolistic politics. He thinks that the government 
behaves like the puppet of bigwigs and as if an enemy to smaller companies. 
He complained that it is difficult for a small business to survive, let alone 
thriving. Some large traders break the low at the expense of the rest. They go 
for price fixing in tender offers. Sometimes they resort to dodgy shenanigans, 
too. They join tender offers just to exhort money from genuine bidders with the 
threat of rising the stake. But the government turns a blind eye to them.  
The unresponsiveness of authorities to the fraudulent deals of large 
establishments, according to Alperen, is deep-rooted in their illicit complicity. 
Massive investments in ship-making, he added, are often used as cover up by 
drug barons for ŵoŶeǇ lauŶderiŶg. DoŶ͛t Ǉou read the news, he asked, Riza 
Sarraf, who is widely associated with the Mafia, has just been given an 
honorary placket by the PM. Alperen summarised his thoughts on oligopolistic 
pressures with a popular saying in Turkey: Big fish eats small fish. Yet a fuller 
picture also requires an examination of the conflict of interests. 
Conflict of interests: 
The evidence confirms that the conflict of interests presents further challenges 
to smaller manufacturers. In particular, an arbitrary obstruction of smaller 
companies from acquiring site-licences appears to go beyond the regulatory 
and legal considerations. Alperen highlighted that even if not all, many of 
smaller workshops wanted to compromise over the new regulations and have 
site-licences, but the government did not actually give authorisation. 
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Alperen said that cabinet ministers started to takeover large shipyards, 
especially in recent years. They go and opportunistically buy some ships and 
shipyards in trouble, rather than helping. This feeds into a potential conflict of 
interests. Indeed, he explicitly pointed to such tensions in shipyards: TheǇ doŶ͛t 
want smaller ship-makers because some ministers have their own large 
companies, and they want to eliminate us. They want it all, including the 
manufacturing of small ships. 
When the government opens tender offers, successful bids of the firms owned 
by high-ranking officials generate doubts. Alperen believes that he is 
discriminated against siŶĐe he ĐaŶ͛t ǁiŶ the ďids eǀeŶ if he makes the best 
possible offers. He reiterated some press allegations that the crooked ministers 
run the country for themselves. Everybody knows that this is an unscrupulous 
adŵiŶistratioŶ, ďut Ǉou ĐaŶ͛t put theŵ oŶ trial ďeĐause theǇ keep eǆiliŶg 
persecutors for launching embezzlement probes.  
AlpeƌeŶ͛s oppositioŶ to the state-led corruption is also a mixture of patriotic 
sentiment: I saw a ship with Turkish flag in Italy last year. I got excited and 
went into the vessel, but then I suddenly got scared asking myself what if the 
ship belongs to one of the ministers. 
Health and safety: 
AlpeƌeŶ͛s eǆpeƌieŶĐe illustƌates hoǁ the iŶsuffiĐieŶĐǇ of health aŶd safetǇ 
regulations harms people and companies, alike.  He mentioned two common 
sources of risks for health and safety; one is technological threat and the other 
one is human error. They both reveal problems with the enforcement against 
negligence. He said that the most dangerous thing in the industry is getting 
poisoned by paint and stripper while polishing in-depth with pressure. You have 
to use oxygen mask for breathing. Industry has to move to rustic (water-paint) 
as it is a lot less hazardous than bulb (air-paint) which is currently banned. 
Even so, Alperen reckons that Ǉou ĐaŶ͛t do much about the human error. 
People are being careless even after losing their close relatives, it is like drink 
and drive. Companies are the same. Ships are full with tons of oil, take as an 
example, and that͛s ǁhǇ Ǉou haǀe to keep them away from each other, but in 
most workshops ships are on top of each other. 
There were two fatal aĐĐideŶts iŶ AlpeƌeŶ͛s workshop:  One worker got 
poisoned and the other one was electrocuted. Families went to court which 
fined the firm a huge sum of compensation, ₺225k for one of the victims, and I 
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paid half of it, but total claim may go up to ₺4m. Alperen stipulated that one 
inspector put all the blame on the worker, and the other one put twenty 
percent on me. This made Alperen think that the verdict was very arbitrary and 
so much fine was just another proof of political plotting against smaller 
establishments. His frustration resonates with a public perception that officials 
do nothing about powerful corporations which are influential in the power 
corridors, although workers keep dying for their profits.  
AlpeƌeŶ͛s defeŶsiǀeŶess is relentless: I follow the book and take all the 
precautions. Can you see ships dangerously close to each other here? I am also 
using rustic paint. The slain workers had not followed the routine steps. I ĐaŶ͛t 
possibly check on each and every worker all the time. Nevertheless, accidents 
upset Alperen not only financially but also psychologically: I did not appeal. If I 
had done, I could get the case prolonged no less than ten years. The finger cut 
by Sharia does not hurt, anyway –an old phrase from the Ottoman times. I did 
my best to help the families of lost workers. 
Responding to Challenges 
Alperen clung to various survival methods from diversifying his business to 
renting out some of the ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s laŶd -to the neighbouring petrochemical 
plant for crane maintenance at a rate of ₺400 per day. We will now review the 
main strategies of these sorts.  
Democratic deficiency: 
AlpeƌeŶ has ďeŶefited fƌoŵ the liŵitedŶess of ǁoƌkeƌs͛ ƌights ǁheŶ he had, for 
instance, controversies with the families of the deceased workers over the 
reparation. One family explicitly asked for two flats, but he refused. When 
there are grievances, workers can hardly take a collective action, since Alperen 
does not have to recognise trade unions as an employer with less than twenty 
employees. 
The possibility of spontaneous resistance, such as strike or workplace 
occupation is also rendered virtually impossible by the gendarme. The chief 
gendarme officer often visits Alperen͛s ǁoƌkshop, and he may get free lunch as 
well as a complimentary diner box. The exchange of some jokes between the 
lieutenant and the researchers gives a feeling about the atmosphere: On his 
entry to the canteen, the commander asked us who are you? Are you doing 
politics?  We said no we are just talking about the president. He replied that so 
you are doing politics then. We denied, the president is constitutionally above 
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the political parties and politics as the representative of all citizens at the top of 
the state… When asked, Alperen stated that I am very happy with the chief 
being around and I am against the abolition of gendarme to please the EU. 
Labour cost adjustments: 
Alperen uses temporary workers, especially since the task are sequential which 
ŵeaŶs Ǉou ĐaŶ͛t call everybody in at the same time. You can only have the 
teams which are required for the day or hours. Alperen highlighted that that͛s 
why we have a special type of temporary workers. We call them cantaci (tool-
boxer). They can go from one company to another on the same day without 
paying any tax or things like that. 
Alperen explained that it has been always difficult to find qualified staff, but 
after the closure of small workshops in the Marmara region, it became more so 
since workers moved away from the coastal villages or gave up sleeping in 
shipyards in favour of metropolitan areas to seek alternative jobs. He 
complained that tasherons (temporary employment agencies) are supposed to 
provide workers, but they actually snatch my personnel by tempting them with 
higher wages.  
The shortage of qualified workers means not only retention but also 
commitment and productivity issues for Alperen. To secure retention, he gives 
workers three meals every day, but Alperen believes that you cannot make 
workers productive by higher salaries for a long time. They will start asking for 
more soon. I already pay very handsomely, over ₺2,000 net per month for a 
qualified worker, anyway. 
Keeping ǁoƌkeƌs͛ pƌoduĐtiǀitǇ high is assisted by the physical demeanour of 
the work: The main production is carried out around one or two ship frames 
under-construction. This means a lack of compartmentalisation and, hence, a 
constant surveillance on workers by the chief engineer, that is Alperen himself. 
He also discovered another way to boost the labour productivity: You can 
make workers a lot more productive by allowing them to make decisions. If we 
do the work in the way they have suggested, then they will do their best to 
prove that their ideas are right. 
Demarcation of work-life balance: 
As noted previously, overtime had already been common in shipyards, but the 
recent rises in skills shortage made the problem more pronounced. Alperen 
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himself also works long hours, so much so that he often sleeps in the 
workshop. This has implications for the work-life balance. He is a community 
leader consulted by the members of his extended family and relatives on a 
variety of matters from wedding organisation to funeral details. He said that, 
because I am so busy with the work, I am trying to stay away from community 
responsibilities. I could not even go back to my home town for more than a year 
to see mom. Alperen is struggling to spare time to take care of his wife who has 
recently been diagnosed with a positive smear test. He faced further pressures 
since his foreman and brother, Ahmet, was bitten by a crazed dog almost to 
death, leaving him incapacitated to work.  
Nevertheless, Alperen hardly complains about the extended hours of work as 
such. If anything, he welcomes it: I find peace at work that I could not get in 
helping the community members, or to be honest, in never-ending arguments 
at home. I love my work so much so that I do not even call it work. It is also 
gratifying that doing more work enables me to support the beloved ones in 
different ways, like being able to pay all sorts of medical expenses of my wife in 
the most expensive hospitals and looking after ŵǇ ďrother͛s ǁife aŶd ĐhildreŶ. 
Spending less time at home helped save my marriage.  
Some employees also have a similar sense of work-life balance with Alperen. 
For example, the security guard sleeps and lives in the workshop, but he does 
not seem to be concerned about it, since he had no contact with the rest of his 
family for thirty-five years, anyway. Likewise, the cook who is the only woman 
in the shipyard as Alperen thinks that engineering is not a job for women, 
works long hours seven days to cater three daily meals for the staff. She goes 
home late to see her husband and son, then returns back to work in the early 
hours of morning. She admitted that I Đould Ŷot afford ŵǇ soŶ͛s uŶiǀersitǇ fee 
otherwise. She then praised her husband: he is a very understanding and 
civilised men. She fears that it has been like this for a while and I am now so 
used to that I just would not know what to do at home if there were a cut in my 
working hours. 
Networking: 
Alperen was one of the few lucky ones among smaller manufacturers since he 
managed to convince the officials for a site-licence on the condition of 
contributing to teaching and making donations in a local ship-making college. 
He proudly displays several plackets in his office awarded for such activities. 
Alperen is the only one with a site-licence in the Marmara region: Well, there is 
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also another one but it will be closed down soon since the authorities ǁoŶ͛t 
renew the licence for environmental issues, he stipulated. 
On top of educational and financial support to the local school, AlpeƌeŶ͛s skills 
further help him to tap into strategic networks: I am a highly appreciated 
engineer, although this is only through heart-learning rather than a formal 
qualification. Everybody calls me to get my opinion if there is a rescue 
operation or difficulty in terms of engineering technicalities. Also, sometimes 
customers need boats with unstandardized sizes. Getting them nested 
(projected) is time consuming and expensive. I can craft such designs with no 
calculation at all. And guess what, I work with the ISO and RIM quality 
assurances. If I use 200 tonnes or more of metal sheet, then I deliberately use 
the best quality control agency in the World, the Italian RINA. Alperen is very 
knowledgeable about the raw-material markets as well: I know the market 
more than most. People consult me to decide what material to get where. All 
these make me friends in business circles. 
Alperen has good contacts with MPs and mayors through the Camia (the 
Nationalists Front) which is well embedded in AlpeƌeŶ͛s hoŵe toǁŶ: I just met 
a mayor and learnt that he was from the Nationalist Party in my home-town. 
He was the one who helped me out about the site-licence. Alperen hopes that 
the future performance of his business would also be assisted by political 
supports. He said that although the government is useless, I will play with their 
rules: I have strong relations with one MP from the ruling AK party and another 
one from CHP, the main opposition party. I am sure they will help me get loans 
since they, too, will benefit in the end, if you know what I mean. 
Downsizing to ashes: 
In the past several years, my company͛s got reduced to ashes, Alperen uttered. 
He lost his employees, up from hundreds, down to less than a dozen. 
Meanwhile the market value of the firm went down to a couple of millions 
from several million dollars. 
Alperen outlined three important factors for getting smaller: The first one was 
my own mistake, he acknowledged, albeit all three reasons were actually 
related to the government policies either directly or indirectly: I didŶ͛t use 
enough professional advice, especially when I was bidding for international 
tender offers. Alperen explained that couple of years ago I joined a bid in 
Tunisia, but the government officials told me that I was not allowed since I did 
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not have a special permission. It was of course rubbish. I have later heard that 
the son of a cabinet minister got the job. Unfortunately, I could not withdraw 
my deposit, since the contract stipulated that the deal was irrevocable, but I did 
Ŷot kŶoǁ theŶ ǁhat the ǁord ͚irreǀoĐaďle͛ was. 
The second drive for the downsizing, he specified, was ͚the eĐoŶoŵiĐ Đrisis aŶd 
the fluctuations in the ǀalue of dollar͛. Alperen suffered inflationary losses for 
the nominal friction between the market values of raw materials and final 
products.  
Alperen is of the view that the third key factor in terms of the shrinkage of his 
business was directly related to the government polices discussed above, 
namely discrimination against smaller enterprises, favouritism and oligopolistic 
propensities. 
Alperen argued that the fatal accidents in his workshop were not that 
important in terms of downsizing, since they did not get the whole 
compensation demanded yet anyway. However, he does not deny its effect on 
his own performance since he had two heart attacks. 
Although downsizing was not a voluntary choice for Alperen, it opened a 
window of opportunity. Once the company has been downsized, he shifted the 
business to periphery activities such as maintenance, conversion, repairing and 
dismantling: The growing diversity has helped the business floating over the 
past few years. No less significantly, it also opened a new door to the World. 
Going global with a small-company: 
TeĐhŶologiĐal deǀelopŵeŶts haǀe ďeĐoŵe ǀeƌǇ iŶstƌuŵeŶtal foƌ AlpeƌeŶ͛s Ŷoǁ 
small-sized business with regard to the exploitation of business opportunities 
in the international domains. Alperen noted that I am doing internet surfing all 
the time to get new projects around the World. I have my portfolio ready to 
apply online anywhere I want.  
Alperen feels confident with a smaller firm in the global arena. Remembering 
his nasty experience in Tunisia, he said that Đrooked ŵiŶisters ĐaŶ͛t ĐoŶfisĐate 
every single job around the world. His account indicates that smaller 
companies may offer globalisation highly valuable direct international 
operations in abundance: I have recently grabbed a job in the Caspian Sea to 
salǀage ‘ussiaŶ TaŶkers for AzerďaijaŶ… I believe that the Caspian is full of 
Soviet wreckages. They need to be removed for oil explorations. 
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CƌitiĐallǇ, hoǁeǀeƌ, AlpeƌeŶ͛s optiŵisŵ is Ŷot just aďout the ƋuaŶtitǇ of ǁoƌks. 
The case of wreckage salvage shows that smaller enterprises can stay relatively 
safe against commercial competitiveness of larger merchants since they 
provide niche services: I charge pay-as-you-go after each removal whereas a 
large company would rely on long-term deals which are hard to strike since no 
one knows for sure how much work left.  
Smaller manufacturers may have further favourable edges in the international 
competition. This is because of not only the lower managerial expenses 
discussed before, but also the under-regulation of smaller companies with 
regard to, for example, health and safety or taxation: Just put together a 
number of engineers and the necessary paraphernalia, and then off you go. All 
and all, Alperen is pleased that such works mean peace of mind, and no non-
sense like hostile dumping or warranties by greedy holdings. 
Discussions and Conclusions 
To rectify the lack of systematic research specifically into the restructuring of 
shipyards in Turkey, this paper explored the challenges that the restructuring 
created for a small shipyard along with the company responses. The findings 
largely fit into the suggested concept ͚aƌaďesƋue ƌestƌuĐtuƌiŶg͛ with a 
somewhat distinct combination of detrimental and benign aspects. 
A number of adverse aspects of the arabesque restructuring present policy 
challenges. To start with, the restructuring has been blended up with a 
recessionary mismanagement. Smaller shipyards were let down by the 
government with, for example, false promises of support whilst allowing larger 
corporations to invest in speculative currency fluctuations at the expense of 
their export-oriented smaller counterparts (ISO, 2013; Torlak, 2013). 
The present study failed to find a link between the closure of small shipyards 
and competitive market pressures from the larger manufacturers, unlike what 
the conventional competition theories might suggest (Held et al, 1999). On the 
contrary, smaller shipyards tend to be more competitive in the manufacturing 
of small vessels and peripheral works owing to their locational mobility to 
follow the regional density of available projects as well as the lower cost of 
land, management, labour and taxation for such firms. 
The research evidence substantiates the concern that the closure of smaller 
companies is related to the newly introduced site-licence scheme 
(Haberler.com, 2011), especially because of their reliance on moving to 
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cheaper lands. However, the findings also imply that even if smaller shipyards 
accept to comply with the site-licence requirement, they may still face 
arbitrary obstacles. Arguably, this points to the political paradox of neo-
liberalism: Despite the pro-competition rhetoric, the proponents of market 
economy may actually bow to oligopolistic pressures at the expense of smaller 
enterprises (Nichols and Cam, 2005). 
Even so, the restructuring process is further complicated by the conflict of 
interests (Karabagli, 2014). The complacency of high-ranking politicians about 
potential conflict of interests in undertaking the ownership of large ship-
making companies generates doubts in a small shipyard hanging in the 
balance. Amounting to a claim over official complicity in money laundering, the 
corruption allegations leave little room for trust in the state as the head of 
alligators in the jungle of ship-making. 
Pro-Islamic, secularist, sectarian and nationalist favouritism (Heper and 
Keyman, 1998) is a day to day reality for a ship-maker, and the access to these 
sorts of patronage networks is much influenced by the stakeholders͛ power. 
Such a situation renders smaller manufacturers virtually disadvantaged. 
However, the findings presented in this study also illustrated that prioritising 
one small firm over another can be similarly damaging. 
The dearth of proper regulations about health and safety turns out to be some 
kind of honey-trap, especially for a small shipyard. There is some reluctance 
about spending on health and safety. However, it becomes a lot costlier when 
a small firm is fined with hefty reparations due to occasional public outcries or 
reputedly discriminatory policies against smaller establishments (Barlas, 2012). 
Responses to the challenges outlined above also add positive components to 
the arabesque restructuring, although they are overshadowed by a democratic 
deficiency. The lack of unionisation in smaller shipyards and keeping collective 
resistance out of question through juristically unaccountable gendarme (Oz, 
2013) deprive workers of all options rather than taking legal action against 
employers in the case of industrial disputes. However, public confidence in 
courts is very modest (Acar, 2015). 
A chronic skills shortage in shipyards is exacerbated by the use of cantaci (tool-
boxers) without proper employment contracts (OECD, 2011; Yilmaz et al, 
2015). The departure of skilled workers from the Marmara region and the 
industry after the closure of smaller workshops has deepened the problem, 
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triggering a growing pressure on retention. Some inventive tactics are 
constructively developed at the individual company level such as providing free 
meals, but the hardship persists. Further, commitment and productivity issues 
arise from undesirable working terms are engaged with giving, for example, a 
say to workers in decision making processes about the production design, but 
such matters also remain unresolved. 
The search for survival strategies reflected on extended working hours which 
had already been highly pronounced in shipbuilding (Aykac, 2008). This had 
implications for the work-life balance: working longer hours left less time for 
social activities (MaĐIŶŶes, ϮϬϬϱ). However, there is an important lesson to be 
drawn here: Even in the case of ship-making, longer hours do not necessarily 
mean a deteriorated work-life balance. Working longer hours can paradoxically 
improve the work-life balance from the employer and employees͛ poiŶts of 
view, depending on the individual characteristics of people. Financial gains, the 
chance to look after family members more adequately, a less overwhelmingly 
organised use of social time and greater job satisfaction can culminate in a 
better work-life balance than shorter working hours as such.  
The results presented in this paper pointed to the vital importance of business 
diversification for a small establishment by moving from core production to 
subsidiary works, such as dismantling, conversion and maintenance. Although 
it may not be chosen voluntarily, downsizing also has potential to avoid 
bankruptcy through a shift toward outsourcing services.  
The case company examined has proven that globalisation is not necessarily 
about multi-national conglomerates. Nor is it true that small establishments as 
such are bound to be side-lined in the shape of, for instance, providing 
peripheral outsourcing services for the large firms (Hertz, 2001). The evidence 
from the ship building indicates that a small enterprise can directly take part in 
commercial activities around the world as businesses become increasingly 
globalised, not least thanks to the transport and communication technologies. 
Some policy implications of the findings are worth outlining. Dealing 
specifically with underemployment and overemployment, as defined by 
personal preferences for longer or fewer working hours, can be more effective 
than a universally compulsory reduction in working hours in terms of striking a 
better work-life balance. For ethical reasons, in addition to the viability of 
retention and labour productivity, it is essential to devise regulatory 
interventions in improving the quality of work. Sustaining the contribution of 
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smaller companies to ship-making also requires preventing their limited 
resources from becoming wasted for health and safety compensations by 
overcoming the under-regulation issue in the first place. More decisive checks 
and balances should be deployed to address oligopolistic tendencies, 
favouritism and the conflict of interests. Besides, the government can 
discourage larger corporations from investing in currency speculations at the 
expense of both national economy and export-oriented smaller shipyards. 
Finally, it should provide much-needed information and guidance services, 
especially for smaller shipyards about business prospects around the world. 
Future research should further explore smaller workplaces in order to highlight 
potential challenges and opportunities as well as relating investigations to 
larger shipyards with regard to restructuring and employment relations. 
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